OpinionThe debatePolicy

Can rich countries afford to cut immigration sharply?

As governments restrict inflows, supporters see a overdue correction and critics warn that nobody has said who will pay for the gap.

Watch in 45 seconds

Key points

  • Slack at home and pension reform, not imported labour, should fill gaps, and low-skilled migration can be a net fiscal cost.
  • Well-matched, controlled migration is a net gain, so cutting it leaves a funding and labour gap that its backers have not costed.
  • Watch official fiscal data by migrant skill level, whether people now inactive actually take jobs, and how governments pay for pensions and care.

Across a number of rich democracies, the political consensus on immigration has shifted towards restriction, and inflows are falling. The economist Alan Manning, a former head of the UK's Migration Advisory Committee, has likened the change to the turn in American policy in the 1920s, which choked off arrivals for roughly four decades. How large the current falls are, and how far they will go, is not clear from the evidence available here, and the pace differs by country.

The question matters because migration touches several budgets at once: pensions, health and social care, welfare, housing and the supply of workers. Governments are getting the lower numbers many voters asked for. The unresolved issue is what follows from them, and who pays if the economic arguments for migration turn out to carry weight.

The case for

Low-skilled migration can cost the public purse more than it brings in. Supporters of restriction point to government data from the Netherlands and Denmark which, they say, show lower-skilled migrants as net negative for the exchequer. Where workers are on low wages, pay little tax and bring dependants, claim in-work benefits and use social housing, the sums can fail to add up. The case rests on the fiscal ledger, not on any view about migrants as people.

There is untapped labour at home. Britain has around 1.7 million people who are unemployed and a further 1.9 million who are economically inactive but say they want work. Advocates of lower migration argue that a country with that much slack should be investing in its own workforce, reforming incentives that discourage taking low-paid jobs, and raising productivity rather than relying on cheap labour from abroad.

Migration is a poor answer to an ageing population. Bringing in younger workers to support pensions is, in this view, a temporary fix that defers the problem, since new arrivals grow old too. The honest remedy is pension reform. Some also see immigration as tempting to governments because arrivals boost tax receipts quickly while claiming fewer benefits at first, a short-term gain that flatters the books.

Technology may shrink the need for imported labour. If automation and artificial intelligence raise output per worker, the case for large inflows weakens. Supporters add that social cohesion and public consent are economic assets too, and that policy which ignores them invites political backlash.

The case against

Well-managed migration is a net gain, and cutting it forfeits that. Critics of the restrictive turn accept that migration has costs. Their point is that the balance is positive when inflows are controlled and matched to the jobs that need filling. Policy that cuts numbers across the board, rather than refining who comes, risks discarding the beneficial part along with the costly part.

Those who want the cuts have not said how the gap will be paid for. If inflows fall, the working-age population that funds pensions and public services grows more slowly. Opponents ask whether supporters will accept higher taxes, a later pension age or lower spending, and argue that getting the policy you want means owning its price.

Idle workers are not a ready substitute. Having 1.7 million unemployed and 1.9 million inactive people who want work does not mean they match the vacancies in skills, location or pay. Critics say the claim that benefits keep people from low-paid jobs is asserted more than demonstrated, and that retraining and raising participation take years and money.

The expected technology dividend is speculative, and the distinctions are blurred. Productivity gains from artificial intelligence are a forecast, not a result, and are hard to square with fears that the same technology is already hurting young people's job prospects. Opponents also note that almost all migration, including the departure of British workers for the United States, the Gulf and Australia, is economic in motive, so labelling people as economic migrants settles nothing about their value. The American analogy is also contested: the country's rise in those decades had many causes, and the restrictions may not have been one of them.

What would settle it

The fiscal dispute can in principle be answered with official data: lifetime net contributions of migrants broken down by skill level, route of entry and time in the country, from Britain and the countries cited. The figures used by each side are not directly comparable, and it is unclear from the evidence here how far Dutch and Danish results transfer elsewhere.

The labour-market dispute turns on whether people now outside work do take up jobs as inflows fall, and whether vacancies in care, hospitality and similar sectors are filled or left open. Productivity data will show whether automation is supplying the gains its proponents expect.

The budget decisions come last. Governments cutting migration will have to decide on pension ages, tax levels, social care funding and welfare reform. No dates are set out in the evidence here, but those choices, and the direction of the economy that follows, will show whether lower migration was affordable or an unfunded commitment.

The strongest arguments on each side, set out by the Global Eye 24 desk with AI assistance. Spot an error? Write to corrections@globaleye24.com.