Should Europe back Ukraine until Russia is defeated, rather than settle?

Talks between American and Russian negotiators in Abu Dhabi have left Ukraine's allies facing a choice they have so far avoided. Jared Kushner has said the United States cannot reach a deal to end the war without Europe, and Volodymyr Zelenskyy has told Europeans they need to pay attention. Moscow, for its part, has repeatedly said the continent's security arrangements must be redesigned. In practice that means a ban on further NATO expansion, limits on military drills near its border and the withdrawal of troops and equipment from the alliance's eastern flank.

The costs are mounting on both sides. Russian statistical data points to almost half a million Russian lives lost in the war, for gains on a few small fronts. Whether Europe should keep funding and arming Ukraine until Russia is beaten, or push for a negotiated settlement while it still has leverage, is the argument that will shape the continent's security for a generation.

The case for

A settlement now would reward aggression and invite the next war. Supporters argue that Russia has invaded Ukraine twice, in 2014 and 2022, and that a deal leaving it with its gains would teach Moscow that force pays. In this view, Russia's own size and territory mean it has no genuine security need for Ukraine, so the aim is conquest and a deal would only pause it.

Russian security guarantees are worthless, so terms cannot rest on them. Russia signed the 1994 Budapest agreement, in which it gave Ukraine a security assurance, and then broke it. Backers say that any new arrangement resting on Moscow's word repeats the mistake. Only a Russia that has failed on the battlefield, they argue, has a reason to honour a settlement.

The costs to Russia show that pressure works. The casualty figures, set against limited territorial progress, suggest an army paying heavily for little. Supporters add that the losses also feed demographic and economic decline that makes it harder for Moscow to fund both the war and domestic repression. Continued support, they say, is what drives that calculation.

It is the cheaper option for Europe. On this view, helping Ukraine hold the line is far less expensive than rebuilding European defences after a Russian advance. Many supporters also frame the war as a contest between democracy and despotism, in which a Ukrainian defeat would embolden authoritarian governments elsewhere, so the money buys security for Europeans as well as Ukrainians.

The case against

The military picture may not support a victory. Sceptics argue that Ukraine is short of soldiers and that Russia is close to finishing its push through the last of the fortress cities, after which the route to the river lies open. If so, "defeat Russia" is a goal the battlefield may not deliver, and each additional year of fighting costs lives for a worse eventual deal. These claims are contested and the article material does not settle them.

Europe cannot yet carry the burden. Critics note that outside Poland, European armies are small after decades of cuts, and that the continent's governments are stretched financially. Public appetite for sending citizens to fight is thin. They say a strategy that depends on European strength is built on capacity that does not exist today.

Fighting on to the end ignores the value of diplomacy. Some on the left, calling themselves anti-war, ask what stopping the war means if not a negotiated outcome. They argue that refusing talks hands the choice of when to negotiate to the battlefield, and that a seat at the table is the only way Europe can shape terms such as those on NATO enlargement and force deployments rather than having them set over its head.

Public money and trust are at risk. Opponents of open-ended aid point to the scale of spending and to claims of corruption in Ukraine, which supporters dismiss and which are asserted rather than shown here. They also doubt the claim that Moscow plans to invade Western Europe, arguing that it lacks the means and that the threat is overstated to justify spending.

What would settle it

The first test is the front line. If Russia takes the remaining fortress cities and advances towards the river, the sceptics' account of Ukrainian exhaustion will look right. If its offensives keep stalling at high cost, the pressure argument gains force. Reliable data on Ukrainian manning and Russian losses would help, though both are hard to verify.

The second is the diplomacy. Kushner's statement implies that any deal needs European agreement, so it matters whether Europe settles on one position or several, and whether it can pay for that position through procurement, financing and troop commitments. Whether Russia will accept anything short of its stated demands on NATO is also unclear from the public record.

The third is Russia's endurance. Data on casualties, emigration and military funding will show whether the war's costs are eroding Moscow's capacity or merely being absorbed. Finally, the elections cited in discussions of democracy's prospects are not described in enough detail here to judge what they prove, so the evidence on that front remains thin.