Congress must vote on the Iran war, whatever happens to Hegseth

The House should use this week's votes to do what it has avoided for 256 days: decide whether the United States is at war with Iran. Rep. Thomas Massie, a Republican, has brought an impeachment article against Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, and a procedural vote is expected today with the impeachment vote to follow tomorrow. Whatever one thinks of the secretary, the charge at its centre is specific and checkable. The article says the Iran operation has run for 256 days without authorisation from Congress.

That figure matters more than any argument about personality or qualifications. The Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war and fund it, and a campaign of this length, with the Strait of Hormuz still closed, cannot be described as a brief or limited action. Iran's government says no negotiations are under way and that the strait will stay shut until its seven conditions are met. Nothing in the public record suggests an early end, so the question of who authorised this conflict, and for what purpose, will not go away.

The strongest objection is that impeachment is the wrong instrument. Removing or threatening a defence secretary in the middle of an operation, critics argue, signals division to an adversary and distracts from the conduct of the campaign. They add that impeachment is reserved for high crimes, and that a policy dispute with the legislature is a political matter to be settled at elections or through funding, not through a process designed for misconduct. There is a further point: the president chooses his own team, and the secretary carries out the commander-in-chief's orders.

There is force in this, and we do not think impeachment should become a routine way to register disagreement over strategy. But the objection proves less than it appears to. The secretary is the official who directs the operation, and a charge that it has been run for 256 days without the legislature's consent goes to how he has used his office, not merely to what the policy should be. Congress also has few effective alternatives if its leaders decline to hold a vote on the war at all. A process that forces members to record a position is imperfect, but it is better than indefinite silence.

The silence has costs of its own. Without authorisation, there is no statement from the legislature of what the war is meant to achieve, how success would be recognised or when it should stop. Troops and allies are left to operate under objectives known only to the executive. Markets and governments in the region, meanwhile, are left guessing whether Washington's position is settled or could change with the next news cycle.

What should happen next is straightforward. The House should hold the scheduled votes and let members state their positions on the record, including those who think impeachment goes too far. If the article fails, its sponsors and its critics should turn at once to a war powers resolution or a full authorisation, whichever commands a majority, with clear objectives and a reporting requirement. The defence secretary should be called to testify under oath on the aims of the operation, its legal basis and its expected duration.

If Congress backs the war, it will own it, and the executive will act with the legislature's authority behind it. If it declines, the administration will have to bring the operation to a close or seek a settlement. Either answer is better than a conflict that enters its ninth month because no one has been made to vote.