Pension spending has outgrown its original purpose, and politics has not caught up
State pensions began as a shield against old-age poverty. Today they compete with schools, policing and defence for budget, and the argument over fairness is turning electoral.
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Key points
- Pensions now take a quarter of French, Spanish and Italian public spending on goods and services, and the burden on workers is rising almost everywhere.
- Reform runs into the electoral weight of older voters and a real dispute over what past contributions entitle people to.
- Watch the French election, Italy's strike and the UK's handling of the triple lock for signs of whether any government can shift the terms.
A system built for a different population
When high-income countries introduced universal state pensions in the mid-20th century, they were answering mass destitution among the old. The Financial Times reported that around half of older people in Britain, the US, Canada and much of Europe then lived in poverty, several times the rate for working-age households. The elderly population was small, the workforce was growing and wages were rising, so modest contributions could fund the payments.
Almost every one of those conditions has reversed. Pensioner poverty rates are now among the lowest of any age group in most rich countries, and in several European countries retirees' incomes after housing costs exceed those of people of working age. In Britain they are closing on the incomes of young adults, and in the US they have reached parity. Average consumption among over-60 households now exceeds that of working-age families in the US, UK, Ireland, France, Spain and Italy.
The case for state support in old age is intact. What has changed is whether the current design still targets the need it was created to meet.
Who pays, and how much
Most countries run pay-as-you-go systems, in which today's workers fund today's pensioners. That makes the arrangement highly sensitive to demography: longer lives enlarge the recipient pool, while falling birth rates and weak wage growth limit what comes in. In the UK and US, public pension spending equals about 20% of the workforce's pre-tax wages, up from 10% in 1970. Adding old-age healthcare takes the figure above 25%, and to around 40% in Spain and 50% in France.
The budget consequences are visible. Pensions account for one in every four euros that the French, Spanish and Italian governments spend on public goods and services. In 2024 the French state spent more on pensions than on education, policing, housing, infrastructure and defence combined. Luis Garicano of the London School of Economics argues that the system is already unsustainable, kept afloat only by what is sacrificed to pay for it.
The distributional picture is awkward for defenders of the status quo. Britain's and France's baby boomers stand to receive nearly twice what their generation paid in, and Spain's older boomers roughly three times. Later cohorts may barely break even in France and Spain. Research from the Brookings Institution estimates that $2tn in US benefits over the next decade will go to retirees with pre-benefit incomes above $200,000. Meanwhile, in the UK around one in five 18-34s is behind on some or all household bills, against one in 40 over-65s.
The contested ground
The strongest objection to reform is not about arithmetic but about promise. Workers who paid contributions for decades were told that the state would support them in retirement, and many reasonably planned around that. Changing terms late in a career can impose real losses: retirement ages that rise mid-career, or final-salary schemes closed in the meantime, fall on people who had little room to adjust. Any credible reform has to distinguish between those cohorts and wealthier retirees with substantial private income.
There is also a transition problem. Moving from pay-as-you-go towards funded provision means one generation effectively pays twice, once for current pensioners and once for its own savings. That is why the more plausible routes are incremental: raising the retirement age, changing the indexation formula, or means-testing. The FT material does not say which of these any government is prepared to pursue, and the evidence on how much each would save is not set out in it.
Older voters are a large and reliable bloc, and many believe their pension is simply a return on what they paid in. The figures above suggest this is not true for today's retirees, though it may be closer to true for millennials and Gen Z. That gap in perception helps explain why parties tread carefully.
What to watch
France is the clearest test. Protests this year in France, Belgium and Greece have followed attempts to raise the pension age. Marine Le Pen, the frontrunner in next year's French election, has promised to reverse President Macron's increase in the retirement age from 62 to 64. If she wins and follows through, it would show how limited the room for reform is when a leading candidate can campaign against it successfully.
Italy is the second signal: unions have called a national strike for Friday, demanding higher pensions and no rise in the retirement age. In Britain, the question is whether the government's handling of the triple lock moves from commitment to design. Any shift toward means-testing, as some other countries already practise, would mark a real change in how pensions are defined.
The longer-term indicator is fiscal. If pension costs keep absorbing a rising share of public spending, the squeeze on investment, services and younger workers' pay will deepen. The political question is whether any party can make the case for change before bond markets, or voters, force it.
Analysis by the Global Eye 24 desk, with AI assistance. Spot an error? Write to corrections@globaleye24.com.